

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE MULTINATIONAL DIVISION: IS IT
VIALE IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS?

by

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ABSTRACT

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In April of 2003 the Polish Government joined the US-lead coalition in Iraq and agreed to take the lead in forming and employing a multinational division in Peace Enforcement Operation ongoing there. This was the most important mission the Polish Military had undertaken since the dissolution of the USSR. Based on the experiences of those who lead the development, training and initial employment of the division as well as the division subsequent experiences as documented in open sources I intend to assess the viability of the division in the context of Peace Enforcement Operation and if warranted make recommendations for its future evolution.

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THE MULTINATIONAL DIVISION: IS IT VIABLE IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS?

Peace Operations (PO) are becoming increasingly multinational in character. They may be carried out within an established alliance framework or through the formation of a coalition, which requires states to coordinate more closely and then plan to successfully conduct coalition PO. Coalition PO, military support to diplomacy, peacekeeping operations, and peace enforcement operations are more complicated due to the complex operational environments and variety of non-state actors involved. Thus, future military PO's will require extended multinational cooperation. Maintaining the effectiveness of coalition PO will require special attention to interoperability issues. Consequently, asymmetries in military doctrine and training, technology, command and control, historical and cultural background, and religion pose challenges to the cohesion and effectiveness of coalition operations. Careful analyses and attention to these challenges will minimize their effects on coalition operations.

Experiences of Multinational Division Central- South (MND-CS) in the Iraqi War has shown that apart from such unquestionable advantages of political legitimacy, shared funding, increased military capability; a number of coalition forces in one military organization (division) can hamper its effectiveness. Twenty-two nations contributed troops and staff officers to MND-CS. Accepting small contingents (platoon size and smaller) from several countries put the effectiveness of the division into jeopardy. Each country in some ways influenced the division's activities. Diplomatic support, sharing intelligence, assists in humanitarian activities, providing funding, authorizing over-flight of their countries, accessing ports, and basing rights would all have better supported the mission than contribution of small units to the coalition. Countries contributing smaller units (platoon size and smaller) provided little military capabilities, despite the diplomatic symbolism of their participation. Based on the experience of MND-CS in Iraqi Freedom Operation (IFO), this paper answers the following questions: is a multinational division composed of twenty-two nations militarily viable in Peace Enforcement Operations, what is the smallest acceptable size of a coalition unit within the division structure, and what level of command is effective for multinational headquarters? Through analyses of MND-CS's mission execution from mid-2003 to 2005, this SRP recommends some changes to enhance the effectiveness of a multinational division-size unit conducting peace enforcement operations in the 21st century.

NATURE OF MULTINATIONAL COALITION

In war it is not always possible to have everything go exactly as one likes. In working with allies it sometimes happens that they develop opinions of their own.

- Sir Winston Churchill,
The Hinge of Fate, 1950

Countries enter political, military, or economic partnerships when a common interest brings them together.¹ These partnerships may have regional and worldwide characteristics as nations promote their national interests and seek security against common threats. The formation of a coalition is usually influenced by political, cultural, economic, technological, and psychological factors. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 1-02 defines a coalition as “an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.”² Coalition military operations are not a new phenomenon. No nation can afford to conduct military operations unilaterally for a variety of reasons: political legitimacy, military capability, funding, over-flights rights, basing etc. To seek political legitimacy, cost-sharing, and enhanced military capabilities, nations will build coalitions for future military operations. There are many examples of coalition military operations in recent history ranging from war to operations other than war. Successful coalitions have operated in the Korea War, Operations Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom Operation.

The international security environment has been undergoing dynamic changes in the recent years. Global terrorism and the possibility of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction pose the major threats to international security. The 9-11-01 terrorist attack on the United States only increased the relevance of coalitions, expanding both their scope and nature. The terrorist attack that rocked the United States was more than an attack on a single country; it was an assault on all nations who value peace and freedom. That is why the military response in the global war on terrorism is not just one nation's undertaking. After the tragedy, within hours, coalitions involving many nations decided to combat terrorism. Hundreds of countries have contributed in different ways - some militarily, others diplomatically, economically, and financially. Some nations have helped openly; others prefer not to disclose their contributions. New transnational threats and challenges require strong and diverse coalitions to address them.³

MULTINATIONAL DIVISION CENTRAL-SOUTH (MND- CS) IN IRAQI FREEDOM OPERATION (IFO) AS AD-HOC COALITION.

One of the ways to carry out coalition operations is through selection of a lead nation, especially when the time to prepare for the mission is limited. For the fourth phase of IFO,

Poland was recognized as a nation with the will, capability, and competence to provide political and military leadership to coordinate the planning and execution of military operations in the south central region of Iraq. The Polish-led Multinational Division Central-South thus offers an example of an ad-hoc coalition created for one specific task. The Polish military enthusiastically created the multinational division, welcoming a significant challenge that would confirm its professional and organizational efficiency. The necessity to accelerate the stabilization process in Iraq and bring political legitimacy to the conflict limited the time for bringing MND-CS to full operational capability to four months. The development process started on 30 April 2003 in London, where the first conference generating forces for the Polish and British-lead divisions took place. During this conference the Polish representatives discussed the composition of the multinational divisions, probable contributors to the divisions as well as their areas of responsibility (AOR). The London Conference considered the north-western part of Iraq as a likely AOR and structured the division with a multinational HQ, three brigades, as well as some combat support and supply units. Other issues discussed at that time included logistics, strategic lift to AOR, and funding of the multinational division. Polish representatives were also present during the second conference, which generated forces for the British-led division on 8 May 2003. The Polish military authority decided that a similar force generation conference would take place on 22-23 May 2003 in Warsaw; it issued invitations to countries willing to contribute troops to the division, as well as to those which were still undecided. Following a successful force generation conference 15 states agreed to contribute troops and staff officers to the division. This generous contribution presented an exceptional challenge to create, train, and command such a multinational structure containing so many different cultures, languages, military procedures, and capabilities. To further complicate the situation, each nation joined the coalition with different national interests. Following subsequent conferences, the politicians agreed to the final structure of MND-CS. Twenty-two states agreed to contribute troops and staff officers to MND-CS ⁴ (Figures 1 and 2). The limited time until execution of the mission, different cultures, language difficulties, and the lack of mutual understanding of basic military activities challenged the coalition. Each nation had a different perception on military activities like: command and control procedures, intelligence sharing, fire support, civil-military cooperation, force protection, rules of engagement, convoy procedures, etc. Only the deep commitment of the coalition partners and their willingness to adopt the principles and lessons learned from previous coalitions overcame these challenges.




FIGURE 1. TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS AND STAFF AUGMENTEES




FIGURE 2. MULTINATIONAL DIVISION CENTRAL-SOUTH ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

MND-CS AS AN EXAMPLE OF COALITION COMPLEXITIES IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW)

Due to the short time for preparation, the command and control structure was not tested to identify weaknesses and workable solutions in worse-case scenarios. Transfer of authority to the MND-CS Commander took place after the national contingents had deployed forces to the

Iraqi Theatre of Operation (Figure 3). From the beginning of its mission, the division faced numerous challenges. The Coalition's Memorandum of Understanding stated that nations contributing troops to MND-CS agreed to conduct a stabilization operation within phase IV (Figure4). However, the assessment of the Iraqi security situation was too optimistic. The operational plan provided no transitional provisions from phase III (offensive operations) to phase IV (stabilization operations). From its initial deployment, the MND-CS operated according to phase III, relying on the dominance of offensive operations. But the Governments in countries contributing troops did not want to take part in offensive operations. Weak public support for this mission and possible human losses in combat paralyzed some contingents' activities. The Madrid bombing, subsequent Spanish election results, and withdrawal of the Spanish Troops from MND-CS AOR only increased several nations' reluctance to contribute to Phase III offensive operations.




FIGURE 3. BATTLE SPACE MANAGEMENT ⁵




FIGURE 4. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT-PHASING ⁶

NATIONAL INTEREST

A coalition formed to meet a specific crisis, the political views of the participants may have much greater influence over the ultimate command relationships.

- Joint pub 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational
5 April 2000

The coalition nations in MND-CS all had their own reasons for joining in the coalition. Different unstated goals resulted in different levels of motivation in the execution of the mission. Some European countries contributed troops to MND-CS since they believed that maintaining transatlantic links with the United States served as a guarantor of peace and stability in Europe. Others wanted to win political prestige within the international community and to seek U.S. support for their access to the universal western alliances (NATO, EU). Pursuit of different national objectives sometimes conflicted with the principles of unity of command and unity of effort in accomplishing the mission. The issue of subordination of one nation's troops to the commanders of other nations is always a sensitive matter.⁷ The combined MND-CS staff structure, with senior representatives from all states contributing troops, helped to solve this problem.

COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIP.

No single command structure best fits the needs of all alliances and coalitions. Each coalition or alliance will create the structure that will best meet the needs, political realities, constraints, and objectives of participating nations.

- Joint pub 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations
5 April 2000

For coalition operations to be successful, they must have an effective command structure.⁸ The most influential factor determining the type of command relationships for multinational operations is the nature of the event that led to the creation of the coalition and to its support from the international community. For the purpose of contributing to the Iraqi Freedom Operation the Coalition decided to adopt a lead-nation command structure. Poland was selected the lead nation for MND-CS. The Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Troop Contributing Nations Ministers of Defense (TCN MOD) specified that MND-CS Commander would report to the Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) Commander and have Operational Control (OPCON) over each contingent of the multinational division. The Coalition then agreed on the multinational division's HQ structure and manning. Poland took responsibility for the manning of 60% the HQ, and the other TCN 40%. The key characteristic of the command structure was the dual chain of command from the national authorities to the MND-CS Commander (Figure5). However, the dual track presented a real obstacle to unity of command, since national authorities tried to exercise almost daily control over their national contingents. Contingent commanders always gave greater weight to their national authorities than to the MND-CS Commander's military authority. At the beginning of MND-CS's mission (September–November 2003), the security environment was permissive so constraints placed by national authorities on MND-CS Commander were not very problematic. But in December 2003, as hostilities escalated, the national authorities strived to retain close control over their forces at the expense of the division commander's authority. Before executing the MND-CS Commander's orders, national contingents often waited for approval of them by national authorities. The provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) determined the extent of the national authorities' intervention, which, as it turned out, was sometimes a real obstacle to effective military command in the worsening security environment. The commander had to use diplomatic channels to change the places of deployment of some small contingents when the threats of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) appeared in MND-CS area of responsibility (AOR). In the changing security environment many new tasks emerged which were not addressed in the MOU. The Commander had to negotiate modifications of the MOU

through diplomatic channels before executing critical tactical decisions. In a war-fighting environment such an approach very often threatened the security of some contingents, since execution of the commander's orders was delayed by national authorities' questions.




FIGURE 5. MND-CS COMMAND STRUCTURE

MILITARY CAPABILITIES TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS.

Recent military operations have shown that military technology is the key to effective operations. But there is a capabilities gap between coalition partners. Several key shortfalls in military capabilities challenged MND-CS: communication, command and control, intelligence, surveillance and strategic lift. A major part of that problem is the Troop Contributing Nations' failure to invest in national defense, especially in new technologies. Some countries lacked basic capabilities (different purpose vehicles, radios, body armor, night vision devices, etc), so troops they contributed to MND-CS were not properly equipped. The U.S. and Poland provided them with those capabilities.

INTELLIGENCE SHARING

Intelligence was one of the weakest parts of the MND-CS. Typical MND-CS military intelligence was not very relevant in a terrorist environment. In MOOTW, the nature and intensity of the threat may change suddenly and dramatically. The MOOTW threat demands greater attention to the political, economic, social and cultural factors. The primary source of good intelligence in MOOTW comes from human intelligence (HUMINT). In the MND-CS AOR,

human intelligence was indispensable, but the MND-CS generally lacked that capability. Within the division, no nation could approach the range of U.S. capabilities to collect and process intelligence data. To support the division with this capability CJTF-7 deployed five U.S. Tactical Human Teams (THT) in the MND-CS AOR, (see Figure 6). Some coalition partners operated separate intelligence systems in support their military contingents, but shared their findings with coalition partners only when terrorist attacks threatened the division. Unfortunately, Poland did not have HUMINT capability and had to rely on coalition sources, which were not always reliable. As a result, a number of carefully planned actions engaging numbers of troops and much effort failed to achieve expected results.




FIGURE 6. MULTINATIONAL DIVISION CENTRAL-SOUTH INTELLIGENCE FLOW

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

It is not uncommon in MOOTW, for example peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions which have significant political implications.

- Joint Publication 3-07,
Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War.

The Rules of Engagement enable mission accomplishment, force protection, and compliance with law and policy.⁹ Limited mission preparation did not allow the Coalition to address this problem adequately during the Force Generation Conferences. TCN had their own ROE, which differed among the nations represented. Some countries have prepared ROE based on a policy of “no-risk and no-casualties.” Because of different TCN policy, legal, and military considerations, consensus on standardization of ROE was not achievable. Multinational

partners' domestic laws, social values, and policies affected MND-CS planning. There were significant differences in understanding and views on the application of military force through the ROE. These factors limited the MND-CS Commander's ability to use a given national contingent's capabilities. Generally each nation had its own ROE. Some nations' ROE were inconsistent with mission requirements and were not always tailored to mission realities, especially when the security environment had changed dramatically. The division staff did tremendous work preparing tasks for units in observance of each nation's ROE. But problem deepened when the security situation became more hostile. The MND-CS legal advisor's work in interpreting coalition nations' ROE during planning process was indispensable.

PLANNING PROCESS

The MND-CS staff consisted of some 300 officers and NCO's, with all partners represented. The structure and manning of the staff was a result of political agreement, rather than rational military doctrine. Three MND-CS deputy commanders, four colonels in the chain of command within the division staff, and some G-chiefs and deputies from countries which had not contributed troops to the division rendered the structure inefficient in terms of a clear division of competences and responsibilities. Such a structure influenced the planning process.

The NATO SOP (Standing Operating Procedures) in planning and command, as well as the English language, created a foundation for cooperation.¹⁰ The division used the standardized order and reporting systems, communication procedures, as well as similarities in staff structure and planning systems. This was a real challenge, since only a few countries were actually NATO members.

The MND-CS planners adopted the NATO Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP). Usually the division received about 10 Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO) a day, which underwent an elaborate process. The division executed the planning process in two ways: deliberate planning and quick decision-making process (QDMP). Tactical Operational Center (TOC) was responsible for QDMP, and the Planning Board (with planning officers from each G division) for long-term planning. The division commander received daily briefings on the CJTF-7 tasks and made decisions as required. Before issuing FRAGOs to the subordinate commands, the MND-CS would request comments. After receiving comments from units, the division staff prepared final versions of the FRAGOs and sent them to MND-CS units. Figure 7 depicts the timing of the division staff's major planning activities.




FIGURE 7. MND-CS BATTLE RHYTHM

INFORMATION EXCHANGE INTEROPERABILITY.

The successful execution of MN-CS tasks required timely and accurate information. The division and brigade Information Management Cells (IMC) were responsible for disseminating the information within the Tactical Operation Center (TOC). Most of the division staff's planning was based on assumptions of the coalition partners. These operations occurred in scenarios which were difficult to predict and which often arose at short notice. That is why interoperability of information within MND-CS was of great importance. Deployment of main combat units' liaison teams (LT) to the MND-CS HQ enabled them to keep contact with parent units through the CENTRIX data exchange system and satellite telephone. LT capabilities normally helped to convey the commander's intent, to reduce ambiguity, and to increase mutual operational understanding. The LT was a part of the TOC, which operated 24 hours a day. Senior National Representatives working in MND-CS HQ helped to achieve common operational understanding with smaller contingents. The division also deployed its own LT at superior HQ (CJTF-7). So LTs facilitated communication at all levels of the organization.

COMMUNICATION

As a combined command CJTF-7, was responsible for communications down to the MND-CS HQ, and the lead nation, down to the TCN independent unit. The coalition agreed and captured in a MOU that communication within national units would be each nation's

responsibility. The National Contingents entered the Iraqi Theatre of Operation with different communication equipment, ranging from the newest to equipment from the 1970s. There were no two nations with the same communication systems. The level of specialized communication training was also different. To achieve minimal communication interoperability, the U.S. 51st Communication Battalion deployed its assets within MND-CS AOR. The classified data exchange system, CENTRIX- MCFL, provided by this battalion was indispensable during the operation. The division HQ deployed the classified NATO data exchange system, CRONOS; this was helpful for NATO participants in the Coalition. Figure 8 shows organization of the MND-CS communication.




FIGURE 8. MULTINATIONAL DIVISION CENTRAL-SOUTH CIS ARCHITECTURE

LANGUAGE

Common language is a precondition for any successful coalition.¹¹ Even with good command of a common language, there is a high probability of misinterpretations within the coalition. The more proficient the unit leaders, and staffs the better cooperation and coordination within the coalition. Units conducting operations within a coalition must be able to interact at all levels to avoid misunderstandings which could lead to fratricide. Coalition units could meet in the AOR as a result of plans or by chance. In a war-fighting environment, misunderstandings could be disastrous.

The language barrier represented a significant challenge during this operation. The English language was the official MND-CS language. But knowledge of English was different in

different contingents. Unfortunately, only a few contingents were able to work efficiently without linguistic support. After receiving MND-CS Commander tasks some contingents, usually started the planning process by translating the tasks into their respective native languages. Then they conducted the decision-making process in their native languages. The linguistic support translated final documents back into English and then sent them as a back-brief to the division. Hence, units often lost important concepts in translation. Employment of Liaison Teams helped avoid disastrous misunderstandings, however.

TRAINING

A well-trained soldier remains at the core of a successful coalition operation.¹² The contingents' training was each nation's responsibility. The speed of the first rotation's deployment was critical, and it limited the chances of providing training tailored to the mission. Therefore, the responsibility for ensuring uniformity of response rested in the hands of MND-CS Commander. Limited time permitted only short pre-deployment training at national training centers. Generally, TCN contingents entered the Iraqi Theatre of Operation with different interpretations of fundamental military activities. Disparities in interpretation of fire support, command and control procedures, intelligence-sharing, civil-military cooperation, force protection, rules of engagement, and convoy procedures were common. Early deployment of the MND-CS key staff personnel (two months before taking over responsibility for AOR) was critical to that mission. During that time, the staff advance party developed SOP for the division and validated them with Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) staffs. These activities enabled the division commander to standardize the meaning of all fundamental military activities within the division. A Command Post Exercise (CPX) with higher headquarter (CJTF7) standardized the procedures with the command. Subsequent rotations of the division received the training tailored to the mission at national training centers using MND-CS SOP.

ADVANTAGES OF THE MULTINATIONAL DIVISION

Political legitimacy is the most important contribution of MND-CS, as a coalition of troops from many contributing countries. Unilateral military action usually arouses negative international opinion. The multinational character of the division has won local population support. The coalition added political legitimacy, impartiality, and a broad base of operational and logistical support for military operations. Moreover, the division expanded the coalition military capability and allowed for sharing funding and manpower costs among contributing states. MND-CS coalition partners have also promoted an enduring partnership

which can make future cooperation much easier. Lessons learned in terms of interoperability can not be underestimated. They can serve as a solid foundation for future military operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

LEAD NATION COMMAND STRUCTURE IS THE MOST EFFICIENT IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION.

There are three models for command and control of coalition operations: lead nation, parallel, and integrated.¹³ The coalition command and control structure offers a political advantage and usually works in a permissive environment, but it may fail if the level of intensity increases. The coalition approach of “no-risk, no-casualty” does not work in a high intensity threat. The lead nation command and control model (Figure 9) is the most efficient in Peace Enforcement Operations. It assures effective coalition response in high intensity operations and provides a tested structure and procedures. The designated lead nation must have credibility and the capability to succeed. The lead nation must be willing and capable of assuming the role. The credibility and capability of the lead nation can be measured by the number of countries willing to join the coalition. The command and control structure must be tested before deployment to identify weaknesses and workable solutions in worst case scenarios. Failure to recognize weak points of the coalition may jeopardize the overall success of the mission. Pre-deployment training enables the commander to examine the flexibility of the coalition and to recognize its limits in responding to critical situations. The coalition partners usually enter the coalition with different national objectives.¹⁴ Diversity of national objectives may lead to lack of unity of effort. In contributing national contingents, national authorities by employment of pursue their own objectives and think mainly in terms of their own contingents’ success and less about the overall success of the coalition. The lead nation’s perception of the mission is totally different. One contingent’s failure is a coalition failure; contingent success is a coalition success: “One mission, one team.” Generally the international community considers the lead nation as responsible for overall success or failure of the mission. The lead nation is responsible for cohesion of the coalition. Weaknesses of coalition partners in some capabilities are compensated by lead nation resources. That is why the lead nation’s tasks within a coalition are so special. It is desirable that the lead nation belongs to a military organization like NATO or the Partnership for Peace (PfP), since such membership may provide the coalition with tested structure and procedures.




FIGURE 9. LEAD NATION ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE WITH MULTINATIONAL HQ

Operational control (OPCON) provides the most flexible and responsive authority under which TCN should contribute national forces to the multinational division commander. Under such an arrangement, national authority will exercise administrative and other support functions during operations. To avoid misinterpretations, a Memorandum of Understanding or an Operational Plan (OPLAN) should describe command relationships.

The recommended division command structure (Figure10) is based on MND-CS experience. It is the lead nation's responsibility to provide the majority of forces and resources as well as to cover shortfalls in certain capabilities. Introducing a multinational HQ, instead of the Lead Nation HQ provides a division structure with more political acceptance from coalition partners. At least 50% of staff in a multinational HQ should come from the Lead Nation. That will guarantee some flexibility and uninterrupted mission execution in the event one or more coalition partners choose to leave the coalition. Manning of the key positions in the division should be determined through of political agreement among coalition partners, but the lead nation must reserve the right to fill the commander and chief of staff positions. To satisfy major contributors' requirements, some key positions like deputy commander or G-chiefs may be rotational. The recommended division staff structure is depicted in Figure 11.




FIGURE10. MULTINATIONAL DIVISION RECOMMENDED STRUCTURE




FIGURE 11. MULTINATIONAL DIVISION STAFF ORGANIZATION

LIMIT THE NUMBER OF TROOPS CONTRIBUTING NATIONS TO THE MULTINATIONAL DIVISION

Accepting small units, platoon size and smaller from a number of countries may put the effectiveness of the multinational division into jeopardy. Each country, in some ways, influences the division's activities because each national command line always goes from country's government to the national contingent's commander regardless of the size of the contingent.¹⁵ A company size unit should be the smallest contribution to the division, and the number of Troop Contributing Countries should not exceed eight to ten. It is extremely difficult to establish and maintain effective command and control, cohesion and operational efficiency of a large coalition within one division. In half a year's time, MND-CS received several dozen delegations from coalition countries. During such visits the division's key personnel, instead of focusing on current operational issues, was busy meeting political and protocol requirements. There were always doubts that some critical information had not reached a small contingent. In a war-fighting environment that is not acceptable.

BRIGADE STAFF THE LOWEST LEVEL OF COMMAND WITH MULTINATIONAL COMPOSITION

Brigade (Figure 12) is the lowest level of command where a multinational staffs are effective. Misunderstandings arising from limited interoperability of multinational forces and equipment at that level may be examined and corrected before tasks are executed at




FIGURE 12. MULTINATIONAL BRIGADE RECOMMENDED STRUCTURE

the battalion command level. From the battalion level down, units should have national composition to avoid mistakes between units taking part in actual combat actions. The soldiers taking part in combat actions have more confidence and act more efficiently when they execute combat missions within a homogenous national structure.

LIAISON OFFICERS AT EACH LEVEL OF COMMAND

The role of liaison officers within the multinational division is crucial to the interoperability of information exchanges. Liaison officers provide the means to overcome challenges of command and control in coalition operations. Deployment of main combat units' liaison teams (LT) at MND HQ (Figure 13), that keep contacts with parent units through the data exchange system and satellite telephone would help to solve that problem. LT capabilities may assist in interpreting commander's intent, in reducing ambiguity, and increasing mutual operational understanding. Embedding LT in Tactical Operational Center (TOC) and keeping them operational 24 hours a day increases information interoperability and coordination on each level of command.




FIGURE 13. MND LIAISON TEAMS

CONCLUSION

Despite a number of shortcomings, and challenges posed by coalition operations, future military operations (from peacekeeping to military conflicts) will certainly involve multinational

coalitions.¹⁶ The multinational division can be viable and successful in enforcing peace. Recommendations discussed in this paper can improve its efficiency and enhance cohesion of the division. Multinational Division Central-South's operations in Iraq effectively achieved military goals, despite significant obstacles to operational effectiveness. The Division's operations have shown the difficulties of coalition partners in command, control, and communication; intelligence; surveillance; and logistics. But the advantages associated with the employment of the division outweighed its disadvantages. The Division's success was possible thanks to successful lead nation command and control structure, an adequate level of interoperability, and efficient logistics. The division offered broad international support to the operation and met with respectful support of the local population. The Division was fully operational throughout the mission. The political gains compensated for some lack of cohesion, speed, flexibility, and decisiveness. The Division was deployed into the theater of operation at a time when the peace had a chance to be achieved through political dialogue. That permissive situation changed dramatically soon after deployment. The Division was then forced to go into combat to enforce and maintain peace in its AOR. The Division successfully created a secure environment, at the same time enabling a political process that led to the successful democratic election. Lessons developed by the Polish-led division must be analyzed and carefully considered in the formation of future ad hoc coalitions.

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ENDNOTES

¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Joint Publication 0-2. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 10 July 2001), IV-1.

²Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 5-0. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 13 April) 1995, II-21.

³Polish Parliament, *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*. (Warsaw, Poland: July 2003), 2.

⁴Office Polish Ministry of Defense, *Multinational Division Central-South. Memorandum of Understanding between Poland and Troop Contributing Nations*. (Warsaw, Poland: June 2003), n.p.

⁵Headquarters, Polish Led Multinational Division Central-South, *MND-CS Operational Order Nr2*. (Warsaw, Poland: May 2003), n.p.

⁶Headquarters, Polish Led Multinational Division Central-South, *MND-CS Operational Order Nr3*. (Babylon, Iraq: August 2003), n.p.

⁷Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*. Joint Publication 3-16. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 5 April 2000), II-7.

⁸*Ibid.*, II-7.

⁹The American-British-Canadian-Australian Armies Program Primary Standardization Office, *ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook*, (Arlington, VA: 11 May 1999), 13-3.

¹⁰A. Tyszkiewicz. "The Multinational Division Central-South First Rotation Lessons Learned." *Przegląd Wojsk Lądowych-dodatek do nr 8*". (Warsaw, Poland: August 2004), 17.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 19.

¹²Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, *Conference on Problems and Solutions in Future Coalitions Operations*. Final Report, (EUCOM, Volume I. July 1996). n.p.

¹³Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*. Joint Publication 3-16, II-8.

¹⁴The American-British-Canadian-Australian Armies Program Primary Standardization Office, 1-7.

¹⁵U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*. Joint Publication 3-16, II-7.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, II-9.

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